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We believe this history to end happily with our not only finding, but
vindicating, an old formula which, by its assigning to each of 'possession',
'property' and 'title' a distinct meaning and by its confining the concept of
'ownership' to the second of them, reconciles all the relevant cases, including those
on realty with those on personalty, those on the recovery ofland with those on the
"transfer of title" under the Sale of Goods Act, those on succession with those on
sale and those on adverse possession with those on gifts, so that difficulties
acknowledged and inconsistencies uncovered in academic writings, such as
Megarry & Wade, to which much reference is made hereafter, unravel and
dissolve. Betwixt the beginning and the end, however, this is a tale of mystery and
confusion. It is a new tale partly told of the present generation of Legal Examiners
of Title in an outpost of Empire, but its mystery and confusion derive from the Old
Country and an elder generation of lawyers; and, though it founds on the work of
logicians, yet its burden is the survival of obscurity and unreason even, in our
deferential and diffident submission and as the Extension of the Tail (lOB infra)
discloses hereafter, particularly in the mind of one of our critics, through whose
kindness and learning we have been introduced to cases significant to our subject
whereof otherwise we should have remained ignorant.
1.The quarry glimpsed
As well as a moral, which will shortly appear, this story has a theme: no more
properly in the Law, than in any other scholarly pursuit, can one draw a line
between pure and applied research. For our research was originally so practical as
to be seeking grounds for the immediate registration of an instrument under the
* Solicitor, Melbourne.
** Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter.
*** Solicitor, Melbourne (seconded to the Law Department of the University ofReading), from whose
discussions on our topic with his recent colleagues in the Strathc1yde University Law School, Mrs.
Osborne, Professor Miller, Dr. Norrie and Professor Thomson, we have gratefully received (whether
or not it shows herein) great benefit.
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Transfer of Land Act of Victoria; yet it became, without any deviation or
fluctuation, so abstracted as to take us, via various theories expounded or implicit
in learned journals, Blackstone's Commentaries and the Sale of Goods Act, back to
those of Coke and Bracton.
In 1940, building on the complaint and exertions made fifteen years earlier by
Wirens,l Hargreaves published an article, whereof:
"the primary object ... [was] to draw attention to the remarkable change
which has taken place during the last hundred years in the basic terminology
of English land law, the main feature of which is the gradual replacement of
the technical apparatus of feudalism by vague conceptions of ownership, the
substitution of the 'true owner' for the feudal 'tenant'."2
He opposed this replacement on the ground that the rules of land law:
"simple and coherent as they are, are simple and coherent only because they
are based upon a strict regard for the traditional terminology of the law; or,
conversely, that the confusion which exists in the text -books on the subject is
due not to any confusion in the authorities but to a laxity of language ... If
this laxity oflanguage can produce confusion in one branch of the law, it will
produce confusion in other branches ... "3
Hargreaves' concern was with that branch ofland law which deals with recovery
against a possessor. The text-books to which he referred included the works of
such eminences as Holdsworth,4 Pollock, Salmond and Winfield.
That Hargreaves' warning fell on deaf ears was attested by Lord Wilberforce
thirty-nine years later in Johnson v. Agnew:5
"Learned judges in the Chancery Division and in the Court of Appeal have
had great difficulty in formulating a rule and have been obliged to reach
differing conclusions. That this is so is due partly to the mystification which
has been allowed to characterise contracts for the sale of land, as contrasted
l. "The Plea of the Ius Tertii in Ejectment", (1925) 41 L.Q.R. 139.
2. "Terminology and Title in Ejectment", (1940) 56L.Q.R. 376. In our respectful submission, there is
an example of that, whereof he complains, in n. 70 infra.
3. Ibid., p. 397.
4. Whose reply (1940) 56 L. Q.R. 479 carries to us no conviction.
5. [1980] A.C. 367 H.L.(E.), 391 and 395. Lord Wilberforce's treatment of realty, as no more
mysterious than personalty and on the basis that fundamental principles governing dealings with them
are the same, seems to us to reflect the early application of the term 'seisin' to both: seeMaitland, "The
Seisin of Chattels", (1885) 1 L.Q.R. 324. It has been objected to our reliance on his Lordship's
complaint that it related to specific performance of a contract. But, in our submission, a case on a
contract of the sale of an interest in land demonstrates the fulfilment of Hargreave's prophecy, of the
spread of confusion from one branch of the law to another, more convincingly than would a casemerely
concerning the nature of that interest, which was already the area of Hargreave's own complaint.
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with other contracts, partly to an accumulated debris of decisions and text
book pronouncements which has brought semantic confusion and
misunderstandings into an area capable of being governed by principle. I
hope that this may be an opportunity for a little simplification ....
"My Lords, this passage is almost a perfect illustration of the dangers,
well perceived by our predecessors but tending to be neglected in modern
times, of placing reliance on textbook authority for an analysis of judicial
decisions."
The passage, to which his Lordship referred in the last sentence, came from
Williams on Vendor and Purchaser. 6 Thus the consequent fulfilment of Hargreave's
prophecy, by confusion's spread beyond the recovery of land to its sale, is the
further testimony of Johnson v. Agnew. Ours is that, despite Lord Wilberforce's
seizinghis opportunity for simplification, the confusion and resulting mystification
now extend further to another means of disposition ofland, to assents by executors
to devises. Our moral, aswas the noble and learned Lord's, is the perception of our
predecessors.
2. The chase begun
Mr. Goldberg drew an instrument intended to effect the transfer of parcels of
registered land in Victoria by executors (who had proved the will) from
themselves, as the legal personal representatives of the deceased, to themselves
and another (who alsowas named in the will as an executor and trustee but had not
proved it), as the trustees of the deceased's estate. Following the lodging of the
instrument in the Titles Office at Melbourne, an Examiner objected to its
registration. Purporting to rely on an earlier piece by Dr. Stebbings,7 he
contended that an executor, who claimed to be entitled to hold a legal interest in
the deceased's estate as a trustee, must first prove the will, lest otherwise his assent
to his own taking of the interest as trustee could not be established.
Mr. Goldberg was duly mystified. His mystification was shared by Miss
McClure, who was then his articled clerk. They attended on the Examiner and
asked why should an executor, who had not proved, be treated differently from a
person who was named, not as an executor, but only as a trustee and who,
indisputably (like any other donee of a testamentary gift), in order to take the
property, needed the assent only of the executor or executors who had proved. The .
Examiner countered with the question: if, on his becoming a trustee, an executor,
who had proved, indisputably needed to assent in writing to his own taking of real
6. 4th ed., London 1936, in 2 volumes.
7. "The Transition from Personal Representative to Trustee", [1984]Conv. 423. The correspondence,
which followed Miss McQure and Mr. Goldberg's persuasion of the Examiner, led to the composition
of this article. Of course, the other executor and trustee, since he had not renounced, could have come
in and proved pursuant to leave reserved; but that would have entailed the sacrifice as well of money
and professional pride, as of time and trouble.
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property in his new capacity, why should it make any difference that the relevant
executor had not proved? They replied that in the case of an executor, who had
proved, surely the purpose of a written assent was simply to complete his title to
the land, which ex hypothesi he now possessed as the deceased's trustee, but which
previously he had possessed only as the deceased's personal representative. The
Examiner turned to his Megarry & Wade8 and read: "This essentially possessory
character oftitle to land is a product of historical evolution and, in particular, of
the old forms of action." H(he asked rhetorically and more or less in these words)
possession is the essence of title, how can there be any relevant difference between
possession and title? But (demurred Miss McClure and Mr. Goldberg) everyone
knows that possession is only nine (or eleven) points of the law;9 and so title must
be the tenth (ortwelfth). "Prove it," said the Examiner, "No pun intended." This
article is an elaboration and refinement of the arguments, which the Examiner
eventually accepted as sufficient to justify the withdrawal of his objection.
When Miss McClure and Mr. Goldberg repeated their demurrer to prominent
(but gracious) Counsel, he suggested that its form could be justified only as an
exercise of poetic licence. On the other hand he cited in their defence the dictum,
"Poetry can communicate before it is understood." They did not scorn this (or
any) defence but, further, or in the alternative, and more prosaically, they argued:
the value of possession is traditionally expressed only as "in aequali jure potior est
conditio possidentis" I 0 and as such is no more than the necessary corollary of the
maxim, "omnia praesumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta"; II for the latter raises the
presumption that, the taking of possession having been lawful, the possessor has
the property in the piece of realty or personalty in question; but in one case in ten
(or even twelve), according to tradition, that presumption needs to be
strengthened; and by what, if not the production of title? Counsel having readily
assentedl2 to this argument, it set the direction for their researches.
In the administration of deceased estates the change of capacity, to which the
Examiner had referred, from personal representative to trustee, is important for
many reasons, not least because of the different powers appertaining to each
officel3 and because it is then that the beneficiary of a testamentary trust ceases
merely to have a right to have the estate duly administered,14 but gains all the
8. The Law of Real Property 5th ed. (1984), p. 104.
9. See Shorter Oxford English Diccionary (1984), sub nom. "Point" sbl A III 6.
10.When the rights of action are equal, the position of the party in possession is the more powerful -
Plowd. 296. For the justification of our translation of jure, see section lOAhereof.
II. All acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly: Co. Licc. 6b; cf. Kitto 1, in Allen v.
Roughley (1955) 95 C.L.R. 98, at p. 138.
12.The pun is intended. The barrister concerned wasMr. Pagone of the Victorian Bar.Cf. T. S. Eliot's
Dance (1929). Presumably Counsel was implying not that the poetry in Miss McClure and Mr.
Goldberg's demurrer was genuine, but that the maxim, un ius expressio exclusio alcerius, is inapplicable
to the writings of a poet such as Eliot.
13. Re Trollope's Will TruSlS [1927] 1 Ch. 596.
14. Com'r of Stamp Duties (Q'd) v. Livingston [1965] A.C. 694, at pp. 707-8 (P.c.).
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rights of a cestui que truste. 15When dealing with this change of capacity and as was
perforce conceded to the Examiner, one encounters two rules: first, that upon the
completion of the administration (also called "the clearance") of a deceased's
estate by payment of the debts and of the funeral and testamentary expenses, an
executor, who has proved the will and whom the will also expressly or implicitly
appoints to be a trustee, automatically becomes that trustee; and, secondly, that
such an executor is bound to assent, before title to any property may pass to him as
trustee.
Further, though the clearance may, in some circumstances, amount to an
implied assent, yet Dr. Stebbingsl6 had deduced from the cases that the automatic
change of capacity from legal personal representative to trustee is, intrinsically and
in principle, quite unconnected with assents or other transfers of title to property.
She had concluded also that it is precisely because the automatic change in
capacity has no effect on the title to property that, before the personal
representative, who has been newly constituted as trustee by the clearance, can as
such trustee deal with the property in question, an assent (be it express, or be it
implied from conduct in clearing the estate) must be given by the representative to
(or in the case of intestacy, where at common law there is no power to assent,!7 the
administrator must take such other steps, as are appropriate for) the passing of title
to that property.
But there still remained the question: Does the law have any, and if so what,
purpose in requiring an assent (or, for that matter, any other step for passing title)
in the case of property which has at all times material been in the possession of the
trustee, presently qua trustee, but previously qua the deceased's personal
representative? As stated above, 18on the answer to that question depended the fate
of the instrument of transfer. For, if (as the Examiner had alleged in reliance on
Megarry & Wade) there be no relevant difference between title and possession, so
that the assent (or other step) can have no real purpose, but exists only as an empty
ritual, then there would be no reason why observance of the ritual should not be
required as well of an executor who has preferred not to prove, as of one who has
chosen so to do. On the other hand, lex non praecipit inutilia;19 and so Miss
McClure and Mr. Goldberg were encouraged to press on.
IS. E.g., He Lucking's Wilt Trusts [1967] 3 All E.R. 726 (Ch.U.).
16. Supra n. 7, wherein Eaton v. Daines [1894] W.N. 32, Re Ponder [1921] 2 Ch. 59,ReCockburn's Will
Trusrs [1957] Ch.438,A uenborough v. Solomon [1913] A.C. 76, Re King's Will Trust [1964] Ch. 542 and
Re Edwards' Will Trusts [1981] 2 All E.R. 941 are reconsidered and reconciled and academic allegations
of conflict between the cases, e.g., Ryder, "Re King's Will Trusts: a Reassessment", [1976] C.L.P. 60,
are rebutted.
17. This is implied in 17 Halsbury'sLaws4th ed., 1349 n. I and in Gundry v. Brown (1678) Rep. Temp.
Finch 370, where it was held that the position is otherwise in the case of an administrator with a gram
c.t.a ..
18. See the text at, and following, n. 9.
19. The law does not prescribe useless actions: Co. Lilt. 127b.
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3.The quarry started (from Sale)
We have already emphasised Dr. Stebbings' distinct use of the words 'title' and
'property'. In fact, in her very first paragraph, she had spoken of "the transfer of
title to the property in question", so that it was apparent that she saw title as an
element different from property. However, nowhere did Dr. Stebbings explain
what she meant by either term. Did this matter? Miss McClure and Mr. Goldberg
were persuaded that it did. For, although the great attraction of Dr. Stebbings'
analysis was its reconciliation of the cases and its answer to academic criticisms of
the judgments,2° yet it had led her to write: " ... the implied assent has the effect
only of making the personal representative hold the asset in question on trust for
himself as trustee under the Will."21This seemed to involve a rejection of the rule
in Selby v. AislOn22 that, if the legal and equitable estates be commensurate, a
person cannot be trustee for himself; and accordingly it suggested to them that Dr.
Stebbings had gone astray. Therefore, in exploring the distinction between 'title'
and 'property', which Dr. Stebbings had skirted, it seemed likely to Miss McClure
and Mr. Goldberg that they would be on the way to discovering the source of an
error; and, in that exploration, they sawthemselves aspossibly taking, by a process
of elimination, the first steps to a definition of 'title', which would be capable of
distinguishing it from 'possession' and which was thus essential to the proof
required of them by the Examiner.
The distinction between 'title' and 'property', albeit primarily in connexion
with the apparently disparate activity of the sale of goods, had earlier been drawn
by Battersby and Preston.23 To them 'property' meant a particular interest (e.g.
the fee simple, a life estate, or a term of years - any of which, whether legal or
equitable, might be absolute, conditional, terminable, in remainder, or in
reversion - or a lien, mortgage, pledge or charge) in or over the relevant land,
goods, choses in action, or other chattels.24Their theme was that "in any given
situation ... the phrase 'transfer of property' needs expanding to 'the transfer of
such-and-such a title to such-and-such an interest'" ,25 because "the fundamental
rule in the English lawof property affecting title is nemo dat quod non habet. "26The
20. See n. 16 supra. On the other hand, as Miss McClure and Mr. Goldberg freely admit, the
distinction between 'title' and 'property' was not pertinent to the points there made by Dr. Stebbings.
21. [1984] Conv. at p. 427.
22. (1797) 3 Yes. 339; followed and extended in re Selous [1901] I Ch. 921. As to our continuing
difference of opinion on whether or not Dr. Stebbings' proposition does conflict with the rule, see
section II hereof.
23. "The Concepts of 'Property', 'Title' and 'Owner' used in the Sale of Goods Act 1893", (1972) 35
M.L.R. 268. We justify our reliance on them by what we see as their success in reconciling the cases on
Part II of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 and in disposing of the difficulties created by writers such as
Atiyah in his Sale 01 Goods 4th ed., poo139 et seq. and Cornish in (1964) 27 M.L.R. 472.
24. In this sense, at least as regards "land ortenements, &c", 'interest' includes 'estate': Co. Lite. 345b,
where it is said also to include 'title', but thereafter we shall observe the distinction drawn by Banersby
and Preson.
25. (1972) 35M.L.R., at p. 270.
26. No one gives what he does not have: see, e.g., Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.21(1).
108
SIMPLICITY AND COHERENCE IN THE FIELD OF OWNERSHIP
result of that rule "is that, although a transfer may comply with the legal
formalities required for transfer of the interest in question, it may yet fail to take
effect because the transferor has no title to transfer. "27In other words, the general
rule of English law is that a transfer of property gives no guarantee of an
indefeasible title to the transferee. In a system where such a guarantee were given,
the distinction between title and property would be otiose; hence, perhaps, the
frequent semantic confusion between the two. But the English system is one of
competing titles, which makes the distinction fundamental; for, though the
interest transferred may be absolute, yet save in special cases, such as (at common
law) of goods sold in market overt and of bills of exchange acquired by a holder in
due course and (by statute) of land registered under the Torrens system, the title to
it can never be more than relative; and, because of its mere relativity, "title to
property is protected by the possessory actions, which require only that the
plaintiff have possession or the immediate right to possession ... [so that] mere
adverse possession of property confers a title, which is good against the whole
world, except the person who can prove a better title, that is to say, a person with a
continuing prior title."28
The strength of this thesis and its applicability to both real and personal
property can be briefly illustrated by reference to two caseswhich are not included
among those discussed by Battersby and Preston and which, because they are not,
enhance the argument. In Palmer v.Palmer,29 which was an action for the recovery
of land, the statement of claim alleged merely that the plaintiff was entitled to
possession ofland as heir-at-Iaw of Mary Brown, who had died seised in fee of the
premises and intestate. It was held that the defendant was entitled as of course to
particulars shewing the links of relationship on which the plaintiff relied as
constituting him such heir. Despite its brevity, the report makes clear that the
contest between the parties was only to prove a title derived from a person who had
had possession prior to the possession of the rival claimant or of the rival's
predecessor in title. The same revelation is to be found in the longer report of
Moffat v.Kazana,30 which relates the finding by the defendant in his bungalow of
a biscuit tin containing money. He was sued by the executors of the deceased who
had preceded him as owner and occupier of the bungalow. They proved merely
(but with corroborative detail to give verisimilitude to the narrative)3Lthat the
predecessor had had the tin with him, when he moved into the bungalow, and had
retained it, until he moved out; and they consequently won.
There is no suggestion that in those rare cases, where English law does
guarantee title, there is a difference in the form of action brought by the owner to
protect his right of possession. But there is a considerable difference in the
27. (1972) 35M.L.R., at p. 269.
28. Ibid .. Our view on adverse possession is in the text after n. 88(1) infra and in section 10C below.
29. [1892] I Q.B. 319 (Q.B.D.).
30. [1969] 2 Q.B. 152 (Assizes).
31. As prescribed in Sir William Gilbert's The Mikado, Act II.
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pleadings. Where goods have been bought in good faith in market overt,32 or in the
case of land under the Torrens system bought in good faith from the registered
proprietor,33 the buyer alleges only the relevant purchase; and likewise a party,
who has obtained a bill of exchange in such circumstances as to become its holder
in due course,34 alleges only the relevant acquisition. By the one simple allegation
the owner asserts both his property in, and title to, the asset in dispute. There is
thus no distinction between the two nor any need of a detailed history, such as was
forced out of the Plaintiff in Palmer v. Palmer and as was determinative of the
question in Moffat v. Kazana. However, as is the logical consequence of
competition between titles and in contrast to a transaction in market overt, or with
a registered proprietor, or whereby one becomes a holder in due course, in neither
Palmer nor Moffat was there a single obvious and essential event, with occurrences
before which the court did not need to be concerned. In both ofthem the starting
point of the story told by each side depended on the commencement of that told by
the other.
From all of this it follows that title is the means whereby one shows that one has
a better right to possession of the property in issue than does one's rival claimant;
and title is ordinarily35 what one receives from one's predecessor in title; and so in
all ordinary35 transfers of property, real or personal, moveable or immoveable,
corporeal or incorporeal, in theory the basic question does not vary: How does the
transferor prove what title he has received and can therefore pass on? In practice,
however, the importance attached to that question does vary with the nature of the
property to be transferred. With land, ships and company shares, where
documentary title is the norm, investigation of the validity (including the
completeness) of the transferor's title must be expected. It is otherwise with goods
in general, where the transferee can reasonably be expected to accept just the
evidence36 afforded by the transferor's possession apparently as owner, an
expectation encouraged by the exceptions to the nemo dat rule which reduce the
risk of bad titlesY
With this analysis, Miss McClure and Mr. Goldberg were favourably
32. On which the Common Law is embodied in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.22(1).
33. As provided by the Land Registration Act 1925, s.18.
34. As provided by the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, s.38(2).
35.I.e., otherwise than in, or other than, those exceptional cases where title is created for the first time
as, e.g., by Crown Grant or invention, or is extinguished and recreated as, e.g., by sale of goods
in market oven, by the sale of registered land by the registered proprietor thereof, or by the
constitution anew of a holder in due course of a bill of exchange (see n. 32 et seq. supra), or by the
operation of the Limitation Act 1980, ss.3(2) and 17, or by accession, confusion or specification:
Bracton (ed. Thorne, Camb. Mass. 1968,vol. 2, pp. 45 et seq.) who on this is followed by Blackstone (2
Com. pp. 404-5), though the latter does not use the word, "specification", and indeed treats the process
as a variety of accession.
36. See per Cozens-Hardy MR, in re Atkinson and Horsell's Contract [1912] 2 Ch. I, at p. 9 and per
Taylor J., in Allen v. Roughley (1955) 94 C.L.R. 98, at p. 144.
37. E.g., Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss. 22 to 26 (both inclusive).
110
SIMPLICITY AND COHERENCE IN THE FIELD OF OWNERSHIP
impressed. For, like Dr. Stebbings', in its own field it reconciled the cases38and
resolved the difficulties created by other academics.39 Furthermore, Miss
McClure and Mr. Goldberg felt that, with its aid, they had made progress; for
(pace Megarry & Wade),40 far from possession being of the essence (as distinct
from being merely evidence) of title, it had been revealed that a right of possession
was the effect of title and so, conversely, title was the cause of such a right; and
surely there are no more logically distinct concepts than cause on the one hand and
effect on the other. This conclusion was enough to satisfy the Examiner.
4. Sir Mackenzie Chalmers, his Gest41
But the matter could not, with propriety, be allowed to rest there. For, rather more
than half way through their article,42 Battersby and Preston were found
contending that, in the Sale of Goods Act 1893, far from being contrasted, each of
the terms, 'property' and 'title', was so used as to have the same meaning as the
other. In view of Chalmers' reputation as a draftsman, none of us felt this could be
right. Furthermore, the formula derived from Battersby and Preston (supra) begs
the question of what is the origin of the title that is derived from one's predecessor
in title. Not only propriety, but practicality, required the research to be continued;
for assents are frequent occurrences in legal practice and sales even more so; and
continuing doubt and confusion as to what is involved in them would be bound to
lead to more mystification and trouble sooner or later.
That, in fact, Chalmers understood property to be something other than title,
was the first and lasting impression made on each of us by the headings in Part II of
the Sale of Goods Act 1893,43when, in our respective undergraduate studies, we
were introduced to them. The heading of the whole Part, which comprised
sections 16 to 26 (both inclusive) was "Effects of the Contract".44 The sub-
heading covering the first five of those sections was "Transfer of Property as
between Seller and Buyer" and that of the remaining six was "Transfer of Title".
Of the latter sections, four45concerned the acquisition of, and one46the failure to
38. Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Clarke (1879) 5 Ex.D. 37; Burrowes v. Barnes (1900) 82 L.T. 72; The
Winkfield [1902] P. 42; Clayton v. LeRoy [1911] 2 K.B. 1031;Rowland v. Divali [1923] 2 K.B. 500;
Buller & Co. v. Brookes Ltd. [1930] All E.R. Rep. 534; Bishopsgate Motor Finance Corp. Ltd. v.
TransportBrakesLtd. [1949] 1K.B.327;Jarvisv. Williams [1955] 1W.L.R. 71;NewtonsofWembley
Ltd. v. Williams [1964] 2 All E.R. 135, on appeal [1965] 1Q.B. 560; Car & Universal Finance Ltd. v.
Caldwell [1965] 1Q.B. 525;Provincial Bank Ltd. v. Ainsworth [1965] 1A.C. 1175;and Belvoir Finance
Co. Ltd. v. Stapleton [1971] 1 Q.B. 210.
39. Atiyah, The Sale of Goods 4th ed. (1971), pp. 13, 139 and 207; and Cornish, "Rescission without
Notice", (1964) 27M.L.R. 472.
40. See the text at and n. 8 supra.
41. See Shorter a.E.D. (1984), sub nom. "Gest" sb.ll.
42. (1972) 35M.L.R. at p. 280.
43. Reproduced in Part III ofthe Act of 1979,which in Part VII by s.63(2) repealed the Act of 1893.
44. The contract referred to is a contract of sale of goods: s.l( 1) of the Act of 1893.
45. S.22 - sale in market overt; s.23 - saleunder voidable title; s.25 - saleby seller or buyer in possession
after a sale by, or to, him; and s.26 - effect of writs of execution.
46. S.21 - general provisions relating to sale by person not the 'owner' thereof.
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acquire, 'title' by persons who dealt with those who themselves lacked any, or had
only a defective, 'title' to the goods in question. The other, in a single instance,
provided for the destruction of a title so acquired and the consequent revesting, in
the previous 'owner', of the property in the relevant goodsY Thus the 'title',
which was the subject matter of those sections, is something which, if paid for, can
be acquired by the 'buyer' even though it has not previously been the 'seller's',
whereas the subject matter of the former sections,48 i.e., 'property', is something
which, as the relevant sub-heading made clear by its reference to transference
"between Seller and Buyer", was conceived of as being capable, even if paid for, of
being acquired by the 'buyer' only if it has previously been the 'seller's'. In other
words, 'property' is something which, if it is to be transferred from the seller to
the buyer, must have been the seller's in the first place, while 'title' is something
which need not have been the seller's but which, if not, can be constituted in the
buyer by his transaction with the seller, provided the transaction be given that
effect by the law as then embodied in the latter sections. Thus, while 'title'
appertains especially to the law, 'property' pertains especially to the parties.
In other words the 'property' which is transferred between the seller and the
buyer as an effect of the contract of sale can be nothing else than 'proprietorship' or
'ownership', i.e., that quality by which the goods are the seller's and then the
buyer's. Further, this is at once the explanation, and the necessary implication, of
the second sentence of section 1(1) of the Act of 1893,49 which read:
"A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller transfers or
agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a money
consideration, called the price. There may be a contract of sale between one
part owner and another."
For, unless it be assumed that the seller is the 'owner' of what is being sold, what
could have been the point of the second sentence? This assumption that the seller
be, and be agreeing to cause the buyer to become, the owner of what is being sold
also explains the confinement of the definition of property in section 62(1) of that
Act50 to the "general property in the goods" and the exception therefrom of a mere
"special property"; otherwise the contract could be merely for the grant or the
assignment of a security,5l to which the Act was never intended to apply52 and to
which many of its provisions were quite inappropriate. 53
47.5.24 (repealed, and not reproduced, by the Act of 1979)- revestingof'property' in stolen goods on
conviction of the offender.
~8. 5.16 - goods must be ascertained before property can pass; s.l7 - property passes when it is
Intended to pass; s.18 - rules for ascertaining that intention; s.19 - reservation of right of disposal
indicates a contrary intent; and s.20 - risk prima facie passes with property.
49. Reproduced as s.2(1) and (2) of the Act of 1979.
50. Now to be found in 5.61(1) of the Act of 1979.
51. The Odessa [1916] I A.C. 145 (P.c.), at p. 158 et seq; Attenborough v. Solomon [1913] A.C. 76
«H.L.(E.»,at p. 84per Lord Haldane LC;Rose v.Matt [1951] I AlIE.R. 361 K.B. Div. Ct., atp. 362;
and which includes a mere lien - Bridges v.Hawkesworth (1851) 21 L.J .Q.B. 75, at p. 76per Patteson J.
52.5.61(4), reproduced as 5.62(4) of the Act of 1979.
53. E.g., ss.14 and 15.
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5. Sir Edward Coke, his Gest
But the effect (whether actual or intended) as much of a contract, dealing with
special property, as of one which fellwithin the Act, would still be what Battersby
and Preston described as "a transfer of property". Thus we can see that this
description needs expansion (even beyond that given to it by them)54to "a transfer
of such-and-such a title to the property in such-and-such an interest", the title
being an appurtenance of the law and the property being the quality of the interest
which makes us its owner, i.e., makes it ours; and we have previously seen55that
the right of possessing a particular 'interest' is the effect of 'title', so that 'title' is
the legal cause of that right. Therefore, title is the legal cause of possessing what is
ours or, in the words of Coke, "titu/us est justa causa possidendi quod nostrum
est".56
Arecognition of the continuing validity of Coke's definition would have avoided
the circularity of which Megarry & Wade is guilty in Part 357(where the subject is
"Ownership, Possession and Title") ofthe third chapter, headed "Estates". There
the authors state: "Title to land ... depended on the better right to possession
(seisin) rather than vice versa"58 and "Ownership, as between two rival claimants,
is the better right to possession."59 If those two statements were correct, surely
there would be no difference between ownership and title; and further, if title itself
54. See the text at n. 25 supra.
55. See the paragraph comprising the text following n. 37 supra.
56. I Insc. 345b; and see section lOA hereof.
57. Pp. 102 ec seq..
58. Ibid., p. 104 ad fin .. In the light of Maitland's work, supra n. 5, we doubt if (at least in the old
common law, i.e., at the latest, before Taylor d. Ackyns v. Horde (1757) I Burr. 60) seisin meant more
than possession of which the law took account procedurally or substantively. See also his Forms of
Action acCommon Law ed. Chaytor & Whittaker (Cambridge 1968), pp. 17 -8. On p. 24 thereof "seisin,
we may observe, is not conceived as a descendible right"; on p. 36 the distinction "between property
and possession" is drawn as that "between ius and seisina"; and on p. 45 it appears that "Littleton, who
wrote between 1474 and 1481, in section 324 says in effect that a termor is not seised but is possessed.
But in section 567 he himself slips into speaking of the termor as seised." In our submission, Littleton's
inconsistency may reflect only that the confinement of seisin to realty has been complete only since, not
necessarily during, the 15th century: cf. the text preceding n. 59(2), infra. On p. 38, speaking of the 13th
century, Maitland had said:
"[W]e have Bracton discussing the problem whether the termor is not seised of the land.
Undoubtedly his lessor is seised, and if the termor be ejected by a third person the lord can
recover the land from the third person as from one who has disseised him; - but the termor also
is getting protection - what are we to say, can two persons at one and the same time be seised or
possessed of the same acre in two different rights? ... [I]n the fifteenth century there will be a
differentiation of terms, the termor will be possessed, the freeholder will at the same time be
seised .... Then 'seised' will come to use the right competent to the freeholder, 'possessed' will
imply the right to use the writ of trespass."
For the old lawyers, perhaps the distinction was between seisin in the sense in which we now use
possession, i.e. , the sense in which we now plead that a landlord is in possession by his tenant or that the
tenant himself is in possession, on the one hand, and mere use and occupation on the other. See also the
text at n. 68(2), infra. For a recent case on the weighty nature of possession, see Marsden v. Miller, The
Times, 23 January 1992 (C.A.).
59. Ibid., p. 106.
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were essentially possession (as they also assert),60surely there would be no need to
talk of ownership or title or, indeed, of anything other than possession. That false
conclusion and the utter confusion it entails appear in another of the learned
authors' sentences:6L
"Any distinction between SelSInand possession as the basis of title is
obscured by the well-established rule that possession of land, if exclusive of
other claimants and not otherwise explained, is evidence of seisin in fee
simple."
For, from their definition of "seisin" as the "right to possession", when taken with
the standard definition of evidence as what tends to prove the existence of a fact
(rather than as a constituent of the fact itself),62it follows that, contrary to the
learned authors' implication, the "well-established rule" does not necessarily say
anything about "the basis of title"; and, contrary to their assertion, far from
obscuring the distinction between possession and right to possession the rule
clarifies it.63
There are other difficulties with Part 3 of Chapter 3 ofMegarry & Wade. The
authors say:64
"Possession by itself gives a good title against all the world, except someone
having a better right to possession."
It will be recalled that by them the "right to possession" is called "seisin"; and so,
from their later phrase "the earlier and therefore the better seisin", 65we learn that
for them a better right to possession means an earlier right to possession. This is
consistent with their theme of possession's being the be-all and end-all both of title
and of ownership; and hence one would expect that, if X proves himself to be the
successor in title to 0 and 0 to have been in possession before Sor any predecessor
60. See the text at n. 8 supra.
61. Ibid., p. 105 adfin .. Authority for the "well-established rule", to which they refer, can be found in
Asher v. Whitlock (1865) L.R. I Q.B. I, at p. 6: "Thefact of possession is prima facie evidence of seisin
in fee", per Mellor J, whose reference to the "rightful owner" at p. 7 is, in the context of his whole
judgment, obviously to the vague conception of anyone who could produce evidence of title better than
naked possession. Cf. Cockburn, Crs reference, ibid., at p. 5 to "the person who can show a good title"
and nn. 70( I) and 2(2) infra.
62. See Shorrer Oxford English Dictionary (1984), sub nom. "Evidence" sb. 5 & 6. Contrast, ibid., sub
nom. "Basis" 3.
63. Of course, if the rule is using 'seisin' in the sense set out in n. 58 supra, it states only that possession is
evidence of an estate in fee simple in the possessor, whether lawful or naked, as to the latter whereof see
the text at nn 99( I) and 67(2) infra and those notes themselves.
64. P. 103 adfin ..
65. P. 105 ad inir..
114
SIMPLICITY AND COHERENCE IN THE FIELD OF OWNERSHIP
in title of S, X must recover against S, if S is in possession. But later still we are
told:66
"Suppose that, while S is still in undisturbed possession, 0 dies and by his
will leaves all his land to X. If X acts in time he can obtain the land by
asserting O's superior title. But here S ... can compel X to prove his title,
and ifX's title, as derived from 0, is subject to ajus tertii then S can plead it."
This proposition is undoubtedly true.67 But it is hardly consistent with the first
quotation in this paragraph nor with a concept of ownership which is not to some
degree independent of possession.68 The same inconsistency is found in the
following sentence from the same Part:69
"Where the possession is truly adverse, there is little merit today in
preserving for this purpose [i.e., the founding of title] any distinction
between seisin and possession."
The introductory modification was introduced because "possession by a tenant or
an agent is no foundation for a title against the landlord or the principal." But it
does not explain to what the possession must be "truly adverse". Surely it must be
adverse to the owner's interest, whatever it may be, by denying him its possession;
and, if so, that interest must be his independently of its possession by him.70
Further, it must be his pursuant to his right to possession and, if (as saysMegarry
66. P. 107 adfin .. For our explanation see the text at no. 93(1) infra; and cf. also the text preceding
n. 73(2) infra and that note itself.
67. Wiren, supra n. 1 and the cases there cited.
68. Megarry & Wade's explanation at p. 108 ad init. is that it "is self-evident, for otherwise S would
have no protection against anyone purporting to claim through 0." But this saysno more than that the
law is supported by practical policy. It does nothing to reassure us concerning "the logical development
of clear principles" on which, in the preface to the first edition (1957) reproduced on p. ix of the fifth,
we were assured that "[i]n the main, the English law of real property rests". Is such reassurance
important? "'It is sufficient to answer that this is a question of title, of which the whole form and
structure is built on theory ... strict adherence to theory is indispensable for the best of all practical
reasons, that the theory affords the only means of solving with certainty and consistency those
numerous questions which would otherwise become the subject ofloose and arbitrary adjudication.'
The value of a theory depends, however, on the clarity and coherence of the language in which it is
expressed": Rudden, (1964) 80L.Q.R. 63, at p. 72quoting, and adding to, Lord Fullerton in the Inner
House of the Court of Session in Young v. Gordon's Trustees (1847) 9 D. 932, 950.
69. P. 106ad init ..
70. This is consistent with the Limitation Act 1980, which does not define 'adverse possession',
otherwise than by requiring in its 1st Sched., para. 8(1), merely possession by "some person in whose
favour the limitation period can run." At p. 1034Megarry & Wade say: "Today [adverse possession]
merely means possession inconsistent with the title of the true owner, and not, e.g., possession under a
licence from him or under some contract or trust." We cannot see where, if at all, the learned authors
define "true owner"; nor can we see how the use of the term is consistent with their statement at p. 108
ad med. that "English law knows no abstract ownership" and, despite diffidence and with deference,
submit it to be an example of "the vague conceptions of ownership", whereof Hargreaves complained
in the quotation in the text at n. 2 supra.
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& Wade) that right is called seisin, then the distinction between seisin and
possession is still important.
6. Sir Francis Bacon, his Gest
Whatever its internal inconsistencies, Megarry & Wade is consistent with
Battersby and Preston in its quotation with approvaFl from the judgment
delivered by Lord Diplock in Ocean Estates Ltd. v. Pinder:72
"At common law ... there is no such concept as an 'absolute' title. Where
questions of title to land arise in litigation the court is concerned only with
the relative strengths of the titles proved by the rival claimants."
However the lack of a concept of an "absolute title" in the sense of a title
recognized as good against the whole world is seen to be quite consistent with
Coke's recognition of ownership, when one recalls that Coke defined title as justa
causa, i.e., as a cause recognized by law. For English law acknowledges that the
absolute is beyond man's ken, including and in particular the facet of the absolute
called 'truth'. This acknowledgment can be found in Bacon's73 essay, "Of Truth" ,
published in 1597 wherein, without Evangelical warrant, when "Pontius saith
unto him, 'What is truth?' "74 the speaker is depicted as "jesting"; and 369 years
later its cynicism was repeated in The Wagon Mound (No. 2):75
"In the present case the evidence led was substantially different from the
evidence led in The Wagon Mound (No.1) and the findings of Walsh J are
significantly different. That is not due to there having been any failure by the
plaintiffs in The Wagon Mound (No.1) in preparing and presenting their
case. The plaintiffs there were no doubt embarrassed by a difficulty [of
countering an allegation of contributory negligence] which does not affect
the present plaintiffs."
Obviously, if the evidence on which the court has to base its decision is
71. P. 104 ad med ..
72. [1969] 2 A.C. 19, at pp. 24-5 (P.C,).
73. Who, after all, became Lord Chancellor under James 1.The healthy cynicism, to which this Essay
bears witness, may perhaps be considered, first, in the light of Shakespeare's Hamlet (wherein the
eponymous hero finds the truth only with supernatural aid and even then not to much avail), to be
typical of the Age and, secondly, to be at least as much the cause for the disavowal of torture by Coke in
3 Inst. 35as, if not more than, was the concern for the liberty ofthe subject, to which it was attributed by
Holdsworth in 5H.E.L. 194. For, ifno certainty as to the truth be obtainable, there can be no purpose
to torture other than the unprincipled punishment of the accused before his conviction. Furthermore,
this impossibility of certainty justifies the common law's preference for the adversarial, to the
inquisitorial, method oftria1; for, quite apart from the inquisitor's liability to blindness from the dust of
the arena, it is a waste of public resources for the court to pursue the unobtainable.
74. John xviii, 38.
75. [1967] I A.C. 617, at p. 640 per Lord Reid (P.c.).
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dependent on the will of the parties, that decision cannot fairly be considered
absolute, but may fairly bind only the parties; and this is true as much of a decision
as to title as of a decision on any other matter. Hence, at Common Law, unlike in
Ecclesiastical or Admiralty Law or by Statute, no justa causa can be absolute so as
to entitle its promoter to a decree in rem (as distinct from inter partes); and hence
English courts cannot recognize the 'true owner' of land or goods who thus, in
English law and in Hargreaves' words76 and in spite ofMegarry & Wade's reliance
on him,77 can never be more than a "vague conception". Nonetheless, though it be
convenient to talk as do Lord Diplock, Battersby and Preston and we ourselves of
"titles", their competition and their relative strengths, in each case the court
actually asks which of the parties, on the balance of probabilities has by evidence,
including perhaps priority of possession, shown the title to be in him; and, ifhe be
not the current possessor, then that possessor is in not by title, but by tort.78
7. The quarry viewed
Once it is seen that title, however relative, is a concept quite distinct from
property, it can be perceived that we may have the property in an interest, i.e., the
interest, whether personalty or realty, may be ours but, because we lack or lose title
to it, we do not have the cause recognized by law of possessing it, so that our
property in that interest becomes of no avail. Obvious examples of such loss are the
extinction of title by the operation, expressly, of sections 3(2) and 17 of the
Limitation Act 1980 following the expiry of the relevantly prescribed period of
adverse possession and, implicitly, of section 38(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act
1882 by virtue of the privileges given to a holder in due course. Equally obvious
instances of such loss are the situations now covered by sections 22( 1),24 and 25 of
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, of sale of stolen goods in market overt, of resale of
goods by a seller thereof, who has retained their possession after their previous sale
by him, and of sale of goods by a buyer thereof, who has received the possession
thereof but to whom the property therein has not yet passed. Other instances, but
to be found only in the cases, are accession, confusion and specification, where loss
of title to the property in goods necessarily follows the loss of the identity of the
goods.79
On such loss of title, no one can challenge the possession of the adverse
possessor or buyer or other acquirer of the relevant interest. Because the just cause
of possessing that interest lies in no one else, that cause must lie in the adverse
possessor or buyer or other acquirer; and, since Coke's definition of title implies
76. Quoted in the text at n. 2 supra.
77. At p. 1034; see n. 70 supra.
78. See the text at and n. 2(2) infra. We stress that in this context 'tort' has a meaning wider than does
'wrong' - see n. 72(2) infra - and (despite the risk of being repetitious) that, in any event, the respective
findings of title and tort bind only so far as the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel allow.
79. Re Bond Worth Ltd. [1980] Ch. 228; Borden (U.K.) Ltd v. Scottish Timber Produces Lcd. [1981] Ch.
25; re Peachdart Lcd. (1984] Ch. 131; and Indian Oil Corpn. v. Greenstone Shipping S.A. (1988] Q.B.
345.
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that possession is the cardinal indicator of property, unchallengeable indefinite
possession must be the equivalent of property. Thus, with the title, the adverse
possessor or the buyer has gained also property. 80It will have become evident that
we respectfully agree with Megarry & Wade in its disavowal of the conception of a
"parliamentary conveyance" and in its analysis of the process as the extinction of
one title and the arising of a new.8t However, following Chalmers, the relevant
sub-heading of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 still reads, "Transfer of title"; and we
cannot forbear to defend one whom we so greatly admire. Though title is relative
in the sense that a court is concerned only to decide which side has produced
stronger evidence of title, yet, as an ideal, the title to the property in any interest,
whether personalty or realty, is a unity and is unique;82 and it is not unreasonable
to depict the loss of such a unity by one person and the acquisition of an identical
unity by another as the transfer of the same unity.
We pointed out earlier83 a question, begged by Battersby and Preston, is the
origin of the title that is derived from one's predecessor in title. In the twenty-sixth
chapter of the second book of his Commentaries on the Laws of England,84
Blackstone considers property to be transferred and continued by gifts, contracts,
testaments, legacies and administrations, but to be "acquired by occupancy" in
such forms and by such means: as the seizure to one's own use of goods, which
belong to an alien enemy85 or which have been abandoned by the last proprietor;86
as the capture of animals ferae naturae;87 as accession; as confusion; and as labour
and invention, e.g., copyright. Blackstone begins that chapter:
"We are next to consider the title to things personal, or the various means of
acquiring, and of losing, such property as may be had therein ... "
80. Cf. reAckinson andHorsell'sComracr [1912]2 Ch. I, atp. 9perCozens-Hardy MRinfra.lthas been
objected, by the anonymous donor referred to in nn. 93(1) and 97(1) infra, that our notion of the
dispossessed's having a property to which he has lost the title, so that it is of no avail and exists only as
(to quote the objector) "a property in nubibus, seems a strange one." But, in our respectful submission,
it is strange only if one is limited by the concept of absolute title. Once one accepts, as does English law,
that title is a matter of evidence between the parties to the litigation, and only between them, it is not
strange if I cannot prove my right to possess what is mine. After all, there is obviously much room for
speculation as to what would have happened in Felchouse v. Bindley (1862) 11C.B.N.S. 869, if it had
been the nephew suing the uncle, rather than the uncle suing the auctioneer: see 35M.L.R. 489 ecseq.;
38M.L.R. 198; and 105L. Q.R. 462.
81. Gp. cir., p. 109;cf Re Ackinson and Horsell's Comracc, supra n. 80. Despite what Megarry & Wade
says at p. 1053,we respectfully maintain that even s.75of the Land Registration Act 1925is consistent
with the arising of a new title in, rather than the conveyance of the old title to, the usurper after the
prescribed period: see the text following n. 82(2) infra.
82. See the text at n. 78 supra.
83. In the text following n. 42 supra.
84. (Oxford, 1766)pp. 400 ec seq.. The emphases in the sentence quoted by us below are the author's.
85. So far as we understand the current laws of booty, prize and war, such goods, if lawfully seized,
would now belong to the Crown.
86. The postulated abandonment would have been of the abandoner's general property.in the goods, so
that the goods ceased to be his; and, since his title to the goods was simply the just cause of his
possessing what was his, it follows that, with the property, was abandoned also the title. Hence
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whence it is plain that, with the acquisition by occupancy of property, one also
acquires title.88But we have already perceived that, title being a concept separate
from property, one may have property without title; and once it is seen that
property in an interest is merely a quality of that interest, which if present, makes
that interest ours, we can perceive further that, even though we have the property
in an interest, in other words, are the owners of it, so that our transfer of that
interest will render the transferee its owner in his turn, yet that transfer may give
the transferee nothing which a court will recognize as a legal cause of his possessing
it. Even so, it does not follow that a court will compel the transferee to surrender
what he has received from us to just anyone.
Suppose we adversely possess a piece of land and convert a chattel and, before
the expiration of either of the respective limitation periods, purport to sell and
convey that land and to sell and deliver that chattel. Though we cannot possess
more than we have taken,89yet, because we ourselves cannot qualify the wrong
constituted by the adverse possession,90or by the conversion, we are generally
presumed to have adversely possessed91or to have converted and, if the contract be
open, to have agreed to sell92the fee simple in the land and the corresponding
interest (i.e., what Chalmers called "the general property") in the chattel. If a
complete stranger to the land or chattel challenges the buyer's possession thereof,
the challenger will not succeed in any action in court, because the challenger will
not be able to prove that the buyer has done him any wrong. Nor will a challenger
who relies on a conversion or an adverse possession, which had lasted for less than
abandoned goods cannot be stolen: R. v. Thurborn (1849) I Den. 387 (C.C.R.). Hence also the
abandonment ofland by a tenant will lead (as a deemed surrender) to the destruction of the leasehold
estate by its merger in the reversion but, because of the contractual element in a lease, only with the
consent, express or implied, of the lessor: Oastler v. Henderson (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 575 (C.A.).
Furthermore, as stated byMegarry & Wade at p. 1036, par. (c) an adverse possessor can abandon the
interest he has arrogated, so that a subsequent squatter cannot count the period of the first adverse
possession against the person originally dispossessed. We respectfully differ from its learned
authors in their implication that, if there be no gap between one adverse possession and another, there
can be no abandonment, but only dispossession of the first adverse possessor by the second. In our
submission the effect of the second adverse possession depends on the state of mind of the first adverse
possessor, so as to determine whether he has been ousted from or otherwise deprived of possession or
simply abandoned it. See further n. 97(1) and the text at and n. 3(2) infra.
87. Hence one cannot steal a wild creature not tamed nor ordinarily kept in captivity, or the carcase of
any such creature, unless it has been reduced into possession by or on behalf of another and possession
of it has not since been lost or abandoned, or unless another is in the course of reducing it into
possession: Theft Act 1968, sA(4).
88. See further n. 35 supra.
89. Thus, if a usurper or squatter occupies land that is let, then, until the expiry, surrender or other
determination of the lease, his possession is adverse only to the interest of the tenant, whose obligations
to the landlord are not thereby affected (there being no assignment of the lease), so that time does not
begin to run against the landlord until the lease be determined: Oxford Meat Co. v. McDonald [1963J
S.R. (N.S.W.)423 Sup. Ct. ofN.S.W. in Bancoper BreretonJ, at p.427. See further section IOCinfra.
90. Co. Liu. 271a; cf. Kitto J, in Allen v. Roughley (1955) 94 c.L.R. 98, at pp. 139-40.
91. Co. Liu. 2a.
92.Jacobs v. Revell [1900J2 Ch. 858; Sale of Goods Act 1979,s.12(1), which in our submission does not
alter the effect of s.12 of the Act of 1893.
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the limitation period, even though it be prior to ours, have any greater success; for
again any wrong has been done not to the challenger, but only to the third party,
from whom the chattel has been converted or against whose interest the possession
of the land is adverse. This is the explanation of the possessor's ability, referred to
above,93 to rely on ajus tertii; for, as we explain in the Tail hereof,jus in this context
is not a title to property, but a right of action whereof the third party's title is the
justa causa. Thus the plea of jus lertii is really no more than a plea of misjoinder of
parties and once more the substance of the law is found "secreted in the interstices
of procedure" .94
Nonetheless the buyer's ability to remain in possession of the land and chattel
until challenged by someone with title thereto is an interest which he has derived
from us and which is his property. He can defend it, and claim the assistance of the
courts, against those who, by force and thus wrongfully, seek to dispossess him of
it.95 He can transfer and continue it, e.g., by sale,96 by gift inter vivos,97 or by
devise.98 Furthermore his possession and ours (for his is derived from ours) will be
evidence of title in him sufficient to defeat a usurper not claiming through a third
party, whose possession was prior to ours, or a squatter or a finder not pleading the
right of the third party, to whom our possession was adverse. But the buyer will be
93. In the text at nn. 66,67 and 68; and seeBuckley v.Gross (1863)3 B.& S. 566, where a finderlawjully
deprived of a chattel, whereof the owner was known, could not recover it from a third party
subsequently in possession, for which reference we are indebted to an anonymous donor, whose
information was passed to us by Dr. Reynolds of Worcester College, Oxford. Our donor, however, has
objected: "The principal argument against this thesis is that we should have to hold that possession is
no longer a root of title." Our answer is that possession was never a root of title, but only evidence of
title: see the text at and about and n. 36 supra and Maitland, supra n. 5, at p. 334. The only root of title is
acquisition by lawful occupancy - seethe text following n. 83 supra, or a title created by operation oflaw
- see the text preceding and following n. 79 supra, or a 'commencement of title' deemed a good root of
title by statute: Law of Property Act 1969, s.23.
94. Maine, Early Law and Custom, p. 389, quoted in Paton's Textbook ofJurisprudence 4th ed. (1972), p.
591. Another wayof putting it is as did Brereton J, in Oxford Meat Co. v.McDonald, cited in n. 89 supra,
at p. 427: "To sum it up, a right to possession in a third party is relevant if it demonstrates that the
claimant has none."
95. Davison v. Gent (1857) 1 H. & N. 744, at pp. 750-1 per Bramwell B, presumably for the sake of
preserving the peace and to prevent the tortfeasor's taking advantage of his own wrong - hence,
presumably, the reference to "ouster" in Oxford Meat Co. v.McDonald, cited in n. 89 supra, at p. 427
and see further the text at n. 9(2) infra; but entry by one with jus intrandi with no more force than is
reasonably necessary is not a tort against the one in possession: Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club
[1920] 1 K.B. 720 (C.A.).
96. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.12(1) and (3). This and the next fWO examples illustrate the distinction
made in Co. Litt. 3b between "purchase by conveyance or title." "Purchase" itself is distinct not from
'gift' but from 'wrong', on which see n. 72(2) infra.
97. Mt. Carmellnvestments v.Peter Thurlow [1988]3All E.R. 129,for which reference we are indebted
to the same anonymous donor and intermediary as are referred to in n. 93 supra. To the donor this case
seems "a clear decision that the interest of the modern disseisor is not a fee simple by wrong. If his
possessory title might pass by being given up to another quite informally, it was something else." We
argue simply, but nonetheless respectfully, that no formality wasneeded because ex hypothesi there was
no title to be transferred: see n. 2(2) infra. With Nicholl LJ's adoption at p. 135h-j of the summary in
Megarry & Wade at p. 1036,we have no quarrel save, with respect, as regards part of paragraph (c), on
which seen. 86 supra and which was not relevant to the decision. See further the text at and n. 3(2) infra.
98. Asher v. Whitlock (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 1.
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vulnerable to that claim or plea thus made. For his estate or interest is but naked
possession99 and is not lawful1 and will not become so until, by the lapse of the
limitation period, he obtains title.2 Of course, in the meantime3 or thereafter, he
himself may be dispossessed.
Once it is seen that one may be the owner of an interest in goods without having
a title to that interest, so that the interest is purely possessory, and once it is seen
that the usurper of an interest, being unable to qualify his wrong, is deemed to own
(albeit by mere 'naked possession') all that (though no more than) he has usurped
and thus generally a fee simple in land or a general property in goods (albeit 'not a
lawful fee' nor a lawful property), two further perceptions are possible: First,
Chalmer's wording of section 25(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 18934 "was directed to
giving protection to those who had dealt in good faith with factors or agents, to
whom goods, or documents of title to goods, had been entrusted, to the extent that
the rights of such persons should (so far as provided) override those ofthe owner
99. Lord Chief Baron Gilbert's Tenures, p. 21, cited in Butler's note to Co. Lilt. 238a which has
afforded us our only sight of the relevant passage; see further section lOB infra.
1.Co. Lilt. 2a. That "interest" includes "estate" appears ibid. 345b.
2. See n. 35 supra. For he has no title in the meantime: Asherv. Whitlock (1865) L.R. I Q.B. I, at pp. 5
and 6per Cockburn CJ. This is so, despite the assertion ofMegarry & Wade to the contrary, op. cit., p.
107, n. 70 and despite among the judges the laxity oflanguage, against which we quoted Hargreaves'
warning in the text at n. 3 supra. For none of the cases, whereon they purport to rely, holds that
possession, short of prescription or the limitation period, is more than evidence (by raising a
presumption) of title and, in particular: what is said in n. 61 supra, of Mellor 1's judgment in Asher is
presumably true also of the judgment of the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold [1907] A.C. 73, where
Asher is approved and the contrast is drawn between mere "possessory title" and "absolute title"; while
in Oxford Meat Co. v. McDonald, cited in n. 89, supra, at p. 427 Brereton J refers to the adverse
possessor's "inchoate title". In Allen v. Roughley (1955) 94 c.L.R. 98 the judgments must be read
subject to the specific remarks of Dixon CJ, at p. 108, lines 1-14 and p. llO, of Williams J, at p. ll8,
lines 9-ll, of Fullagar J, at p. 128, lines 1-12, of Kitto J, in the whole paragraph which begins at p. 139
and of Taylor J, at p. 145 in the first 5 lines of the last paragraph. In Nair Service Society v. Alexander
A.I.R. 1968 S.c. 1165per Hidayatullah J, one must have regard to the use of "pn'mafacie" twice at p.
1173and in Oxford Meat Co. v.McDonald to the words including and following "deemed" at p. 426,
while Spark v. Three Minute Car Wash (1970) 92W.N. (N.S.W.) 1087is butan avowed following and
application ofAsher v. Whitlock, Perry v.Clissold, Allen v.Roughley and Oxford Meat Co. v.McDonald.
Cf. Hargreaves, supra n. 2, p. 383. AsWiren, supra n. 1(1),p. 152said: "To use an ancient phraseology,
the defendant is usually in by title or by tort, and there is little need for other classification." Cf. Co.
Lilt. 2a, quoted in n. 72 infra.
3. In this event, whether or not he takes action against the usurper, time will continue to run against the
party originally dispossessed, because the new usurper possesses, albeit adversely, the very interest
which we ourselves acquired by our usurpation, or squatting, or finding and then sold. Thus the new
usurper can be challenged by our buyer at any time before the limitation period, calculated from the
time ofthe new usurpation, has expired - per Nicholls LJ, supra n. 97, at p. 135f-h, but by the party,
whom we dispossessed, only before the expiry of the limitation period calculated from the time of our
taking - ibid. at p. 132e-f. See also n. 86 supra.
4. More orless reproduced as s.25( I) of the Act of 1979. It read: "(2) Where a person having bought or
agreed to buy goods obtains, with the consent of the seller, possession of the goods, or of the documents
of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of
the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof, to any person
receiving the same in good faith and without notice of any lien or other right of the original seller in
respect of the goods, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were a
mercantile agent in possession ofthe goods or documents of title with the consent of the owner."
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who had so entrusted the goods or documents of title to the factor or agent. There
is not the slightest indic~tion in the statute that it was intended to take so radical a
step as to depart (except in the limited circumstances ... indicated) from the
cardinal principle of the law of property in chattels embodied in the Latin maxim
nemo dat quod non habet, so as to enable a factor or agent, entrusted with goods by a
thief or a purchaser from a thief, to give a good title to a bona fide purchaser from
him."5 Secondly, the oft-repeated6 criticism of Chalmers' wording is unwarranted.
At the end of the sub-section the expression 'owner', rather than 'seller', was
used because the expression forms, not part of the description of the sale, for the
effect whereof the draftsman was making provision, but part of the unreal
condition to which that effect was being equated. Clearly, the principal of the
hypothetical mercantile agent was supposed to be 'the owner'. But, equally clearly,
'the owner' could refer only to 'the owner' of the subject matter of the relevant sale
or agreement to sell. In the case of a thief or a purchaser from a thief that interest
would be the general property in the goods unsupported by title. Therefore the
owner of an interest in the goods, which amounted to the general property with
title, clearly would not be affected by such a transaction as was envisaged in the
sub-section.
A fortiori, once it is seen that possession is a concept asmuch to be distinguished
from property as from title, it is possible to perceive that possession, which is
neither supported by title in the possessor nor adverse to the interest of another,
will not constitute property in the possessor. Therefore a bailee or an agent need
not have any property in the goods of the bailor or the principal. A mere agent
cannot sue in respect of any injury to goods in his care; for the only possession is
of,7 and the only injury is to, the principal. If a mere agent's apparent possession be
challenged, he can only rely on the possession of his principal. On the other hand:
the capacity of a defendant in possession to plead jus tertii explains the bailee's
capacity to defend his own possession against all except the bailor or one with
evidence of title superior to the bailor's; while the limitation, of the capacity to
plead jus tertii to a defendant in possession, explains the bailee's right to sue for
deprivation of, or damage done, to goods in his possession.8 The tortfeasor cannot
plead the jus of the bailor, even if as a result of the tort he has gained possession of
5. Per Lord Goff of Chieveley in Narional Employers Insurance Lcd. v. Jones [1990] A.C. 24 pp.
58H-59B (H.L.).
6. E.g., judicially, per May LJ, ibid. C.A., at p. 39E and, academically, by Battersby and Preston, supra
n. 23, p. 284 ad inir.
7. N arional M ercanrile Bank v. Rymill (1881) 44 L. T.N. S. 767 (C.A.), in our submission, demonstrates
our proposition in the converse situation. We do not share the doubts concerning this case expressed in
R. H. Wills & Son v. Brirish Car Aucrions [1978] 1 W.L.R. 439 (C.A.), at p. 443C, per Lord Denning
MR, and at p. 444Bper Roskill L], both of whom founded on Hollins v. Fowler (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 757
H.L.(E); for in the last mentioned case it was expressly (and unanimously) held that the defendants had
acted as principals: ibid. at p. 794 per Lord Chelmsford, at p. 796 per Lord Cairns LC, at p. 798 per Lord
Hatherley and at p. 800 per Lord O'Hagan.
8. The Winkfield [1902] P. 42 (C.A.).
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the goods; for that would be to enable him to take advantage of his own wrong.
Hence metaphorically (or, perhaps, laxly) "against a wrongdoer, possession is a
title",9 which can be defeated by a jus tertii only if the tortfeasor claims under it
himself. 10 There is no need to postulatel L a special property in every bailee, any
more than in a licensee of realty.l2 This concept can properly be confined to such as
those with rights of security, whether lienors or pawnees,13 who need it not to be
able to resistthe title of the lienee or pawnor, which they could do by virtue of their
contract, but so that they may, at law, assign the security.14
8. The quarry pursued (into Succession)
In the light of the foregoing, let us return to executors' assents. L5 Blackstone said: 16
"[The] bequest transfers an inchoate property to the legatee, but the legacy
is not perfect without the assent of the executor: for if I have a general or
pecuniary legacy of 100/, or a specific one of a piece of plate, I cannot in either
case take it withoutthe consent of the executor. For in him all the chattels are
vested; and it is his business first of all to see whether there is a sufficient
fund left to pay the debts of the testator: the rule of equity being, that a man
must be just, before he is permitted to be generous." 17
A pecuniary or a general legacy is one which mayor may not be part of the
9. Per Lord Campbell C], inJeffriesv. G.W.R. (1856) 5 E. & B. 802,atp. 805.Nulluscommodum capere
potest de injuria sua propria appears in Co. Litt. 148b.
10. The Winkfield, supra n. 8(2) at p. 54per Collins MR. See further, ibid, at p. 56per eumdem. Likewise
a bailee, being estopped from denying the bailor's title, can plead ius tertii only with the express
authority, and on behalf, of the tertius.
II. As, e.g., in Schmitthoff, The Sale of Goods (1966), p. 219. As to judicial controversy on the point, see
n. 14 infra.
12. Marchant v. Charters [1977] 3 All E.R. 918 (C.A.), at p. 922g, per Lord Denning MR.
13. See n. 51, supra.
14.Bullv. Faulkner (1848)2DeG. & Sm. 772(lien);Donald v. Suckling (1866) L.R. 1Q.B. 585 (pledge).
Quaere: a special property conferred by hire (as appears from Lee v. Atkinson & Brooks (1699) Yelv.
172, though a simple finding of a right of possession in the plaintiff would have been enough to justify
the decision); but at most, in our submission, despite the breadth of that judgment, only if the bailee has
the right to assign the right to use the goods. For in Roberts v. Wyatt (1810) 2 Taunt. 268 both
Mansfield CJ, and Chambre J, were at pains to say that a simple bailment, albeit pursuant to a contract,
conferred not a "special", but only a "temporary", property which surely cannot be distinguished from
a mere right to possession. Even in Gordon v.Harper (1796) 7 T.R. 9 (an unsuccessful action of trover
against a sheriff by a landlord in respect of the seizure of his goods from the tenant of furnished
premises) there is no mention in the judgments of a special property in the tenant, but only of the
landlord's lack of an immediate right to possession. But contra Watson B, in Sands v. Shedden (1859) I
F. & F. 556.
15. See the text following n. 16 supra.
16.2 Com. 512. The emphases in the quotation are the author's.
17. As Blackstone here implies, at common law the power to assent applied only to personalty. On the
reason for this and on the history of the changes worked by statute on the relationship between assents
and testamentary gifts, see a further article by Stebbings, "The Common Law Power of Assent over
Personal Property", [1990] Conv. 257. Our concern in this piece is with the current position, as to
which see the text at nn. 42(2) and 48(2) infra.
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testator's property. Thus a gift of £100 money or £100 stock does not imply that
the estate includes either 1110neyor stock. If it does not, the executor must raise the
money or buy the stock. A specific legacy is a gift of a particular article. 18To adopt
the parlance of the Sale of Goods Act: a general or a pecuniary legacy is a
disposition either of future goodsl9 or of existing but unascertained goods;20 and a
specific legacy a disposition of specific goods.21 Moreover, Blackstone makes it
plain that, in the same parlance, a legacy is a conditional disposition,22 the
condition being the payment of the testators' debts (including the funeral and
testamentary expenses)23 which we have earlier learnt to call the clearance of the
estate.24 I t is through the recognition of this condition that the function of assents
can be discovered.
As the Sale of Goods Act 1979 demonstrates: unless and until the condition of a
transfer of property in an interest be fulfilled, the transfer cannot take effect; but
once the condition be fulfilled then, if the subject matter of the transfer be
identified and agreed upon, the transfer takes effect without more ado; and hence
the provisions of section 18 rule 1of the Act.25 The assent of the executor or of the
administrator cum testamento annexo is his acknowledgment that, apart from the
subject matter of the testamentary gift, there are assets in the estate sufficient to
meet the debts and expenses; and it is irrevocable. 26Hence, if the subject matter of
the gift be specific, the property in that subject matter passes on the clearance of
the estate or on an earlier assent. Furthermore, in the case of any specific chane1 to
which a documentary title does not pertain, the representative's assent, whether
. express or implied, is enough to transfer the title, so as to enable the donee to sue at
law for its recovery, whether from the representative27 or a stranger; for, the
property being disposed of by the will,28 the assent can benefit only the true donee,
18. Bothamley v. Sherson (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 304, at pp. 308-9per Jessel MR. See also reElcom [1894] 1
Ch. 303 (C.A.).
19. Defined in the Act of 1979, s.61(1).
20. As envisaged ibid., s.18 r.5(1).
21. Supra n. 19(2).
22. As envisaged, ibid ..
23.2 Com. 511.
24. See the text following n. 15(1) supra.
25. "Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state the
property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made ... " Even in gifts, there must be
agreement: Re Wimpen's [1914] 1 Ch. 502.
26. Noell v. Robinson (1681) 2 Vent. 358.
27. Barton's Case (1677) I Freem. 289; Doe d. Lord Saye and Sele v. Guy (1802) 3 East 120.
28. So that an administrator c. t. a. has power to assent - see n. 17( 1) supra - and so that, if the gift be
unconditional, so must the assent be, even if the representative purports to attach a condition: Westwick
v. Wyer (1591) 4 Co. Rep. 28a.
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even if the chattel be delivered to the wrong person.29But, if the gift be not of a
specific asset, even one without a documentary title thereto pertaining, an assent
does not give the donee the right to sue at law. For a will can no more dispose of
property in unascertained goods, than can a contract of sale.30In the case of a
general legacy or of a share on a partial intestacy, therefore, the donee must have
recourse to equity, if payment be not voluntary.31
Mention of documentary title brings us back to two distinctions previously
drawn: between assets with, and assets without, documentary titles;32and between
express assents and assents to be implied from the representative's conduct in
clearing the estate.33The implication arises not simply out of the common law's
general lack of formality regarding personalty, but its combination with the
maxim, omnia praesumuntur rite et so/enniter esse acta;34 for from an assent's being a
mere, but requisite, admission that the subject of a gift is not needed for the
clearance of the estate it follows that, on a clearance, an executor's duty to allow the
will to take effect involves an obligation to assent. Assents so implied are effective
to pass title only to specified assets without documentary title, such as personal
chattels,35bearer securities and cash in hand or at bank.36As regards them, no
further legal formalities, than the clearance itself, are needed for the passing of
title. Only procedural steps remain to be taken, such as delivery, or instructing the
bank manager; and such steps have nothing to do with title. It is otherwise if
documentary title does exist, for example, in the case of registered stocks and
shares where, after the clearance, there are required a transfer form and alteration
of the register. In that case, (there being generally no prescribed form of an
29. Re Wesr [1902] 2 Ch. 180. One, therefore, does not necessarily have to regard an assent, as was
suggested by Kekewich J,when dealing with specific bequests ofleaseho1ds inRe Culverhouse [1896]2
Ch. 251,253, as "an exception from the general law that a man requires, in order to complete his title,
something in the nature of a conveyance"; for, if the gift be specific, the will, once the condition is
fulfilled by the assent, is the conveyance: see the text an nn. 25-28(2) supra. The modern statutory
requirement of a written assent in connexion with estates in land was presumably introduced because
of the danger inherent in the doubts attendant on the informality of assents at common law, e.g., inDoe
d. Hayes v. Srurges (1816) 7 Taunt. 217. Cf. the "Reasons for passing this Act" set out in the Statute of
Frauds 1677, the effect of the statute not to avoid, but to render unenforceable, contracts within its
ambit and Equity's evasion of that effect. Even as regards a partial intestacy, one can argue that the will
disposes of the property to the personal representative on a trust implied from the current statute of
distributions (ef. the text at n. 45 infra) and thereby justify the existence in that circumstance of the
power to assent which is referred to in 17 Ha1sbury's Laws of England 4th ed. (1976), 1345.
30. Sale of Goods Act 1979, s.16.
31. Deeks v. Srrurr (1794) 5 T.R. 690.
32. See the text preceding n. 36 supra.
33. See the text preceding n. 17(1) supra.
34. See n. 11(1) supra.
35. As defined in the Administration of Estates Act 1925, s.55.
36. Arrenborough v. Solomon [1913] A.C. 76 (H.L.(E.)), as explained by Stebbings, supra n. 7(1), at p.
426.
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assent's expression)37 by his submission to the company of the form of transfer
from himself, as personal representative, to himself in some other capacity38 or to
another legatee, the executor or administrator has given his express assent to his
holding of the asset in his new capacity or to its being held by the other legatee.
In short: wherever a documentary title is required, obviously (to be valid) it
must be complete; and so, in the case of an asset with documentary title one must
have a document to transfer the title to a testamentary gift, i.e., to record the
satisfaction (at the date of the document or previously) of the condition precedent
to the passing of the property in an interest from the executor, who has proved, to
the beneficiary, whether the beneficiary be entitled absolutely, or as a trustee, and
whether the beneficiary be the same person as, or different from, the executor.
Nothing more is needed even when the trustee is an executor who has not proved;
for there is no need to see written assents (whether by an executor to himself as
trustee or to beneficiaries, including himself, generally) as ever being more than
such documentary records. In truth, in cases of documentary title can there be any
room at all for implied assent?39 If there has been no previous express assent by the
representative,40 the only assent is that expressed in the appropriate document.
Thus do we justify the registration of the instrument of transfer ofland wherewith
this hunt began. Thus also do we, like Lord Wilberforce, pierce the mystery.41 For
thus have we demonstrated that if there be documentary title there is no
distinction, in the area of this discussion, between land and other assets because,
since Re King's Will Trusts,42 it has been accepted that by the Administration of
Trusts Act 1925, section 36(4), which has preserved, extended and, indeed (by its
demand for writing), strengthened the requirement of the common law, a written
assent is necessary to pass the legal title in land from a personal representative to a
trustee, even when each is embodied in the same person.
Nonetheless, although the only effect of an assent, express or implied, by
representatives who have cleared the estate, is to transfer the title (so that the title
may follow the property in the relevant interest which, on the completion of the
administration of the estate and its accomplishment of the condition precedent to
37. Doe d. Sturges v. Tatchell (1832) 3B. & Ad. 675. Thus where an asset has been specifically left to an
executor upon trust, he has been held to have become the trustee of it when he has severed it from the
rest of the estate: Phillipo v. Munnings (1837) 2 My. & Cr. 309. Of course, he could also execute a
declaration of trust.
38. And, probably (even when he takes as a trustee) in ostensibly a purely personal capacity, there being
a prohibition on companies' recognition of trusts in their shares: Companies (Tables A to F)
Regulations 1985 Schedule, Table A art. 5. as required by Companies Act 1985,s.360. We doubt that
any regulations, which may be made pursuant to s.207 of the Companies Act 1989, will affect our
characterization of stocks and shares.
39. But see Stebbings, supra n. 7(1), at p. 426 in the first sentence of the last paragraph.
40. Unlike, e.g., re Grovesnor [1916] 2 Ch. 375.
41. See the text at and n. 5(1), supra.
42. [1964] Ch. 542. A statement of the Common Law may be found in Halsbury's SJatutes in the notes
to the Administration of Estates Act 1925, s.8.
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the gift, was earlier and automatically transferred to the donee), 43 yet in the case of
a gift of a specific asset to which pertains a documentary title, unless the assent
consist in or be followed by the appropriate piece of writing, even it does not give
the donee the right to sue at law and the donee must have recourse to equity. This
is so, not because the donee lacks the property in the asset, but because he lacks the
justa causa possidendi on which alone a court of law can act.44 In these cases,
however, a court of equity will recognize the representatives as bare trustees and
will enforce the donee's call for the title to his property by compelling them to sign,
seal (if necessary) and deliver the appropriate document. If a sole representative be
himselfthe donee absolutely and beneficially, then presumably he may be trusted
to look after his own interests and to follow the assent with that document. Ifhe be
the donee, but only as trustee, the cestui que truste may seek the help of equity to
ensure that the subject matter of the trust is properly constituted and handled.
Once it is seen that an assent is essentially the acknowledgment of the fulfilment
of a condition precedent to a disposition, it can also be perceived why, in the case of
intestacy, there is no place for the operation of the doctrine of assent. For, ex
hypothesi in the case of intestacy, there has been no effective disposition. Although
statutes of distribution on intestacy may have been described "as in substance
nothing more than a will made by the legislature for the intestate", 45 in practice
this description was just as much "a loose metaphorical term" as was 'statutory
conveyance', when applied to the operation of the statutes oflimitations.46 Neither
the administrator nor the beneficiaries have ever derived their interests in the
deceased's estate from the legislation. The administrator has always taken his from
the grant47 and only from him have the beneficiaries taken theirs. They therefore
43. Admittedly in re King's Will Trusts [1964] Ch. 542, at p. 548 Pennycuick J, disapproved of the
suggestion, "that where the personal representative is alsoentitled in some other capacity, for example,
as trustee of the will, as beneficiary, or otherwise, to the estate or interest, he may come to hold the
estate or interest in that other capacity without any written assent." But the proposition, as expressed
by his Lordship, is compressed insofar as it lacks the necessary expansion set out in the text above at n.
25(1) and following n. 54; and, of course, if in the expression "estate or interest" his Lordship was
including 'title', as presumably he must have been, seeing that he does not mention 'title' separately at
all, his words do not affect our argument. On the other hand we claim support from those of Viscount
Haldane LC, in Auenborough v. Solomon [1913]A.C. 76, at p. 83: "The transfer is not made by the mere
force of the assent of the executor, but by virtue of the dispositions of the will which have become
operative because of this assent." See further, 14 Halsbury's Laws (2nd ed.) 343 and 344, where is
recognized the distinction between the "inchoate property" created by the bequest and the "title"
which is transferred by the assent; and also re Cunliffe-Owen [1953] Ch. 545, at pp. 558-60, per
Evershed MR, to the effect that the "right" (which his Lordship evidently uses in a sense different
from Coke's) of a legatee, even a residuary legatee, is the same before and after the completion of the
administration of the estate; for which last reference we thank Professor P. Jackson of Reading
University.
44. We submit this sentence to comprise the same distinction and its point, aswere made by Jenkins LJ,
in Re Rose [1952] 1 Ch. 499, at pp. 518-519.
45. Cooper v. Cooper (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 53, at p. 66 per Lord Cairns LC.
46. See the text at and n. 81 supra.
47. CheEly V. CheEly [1916] I A.C. 603 at pp. 608-9 per Lord Parker of Waddington (P.c.).
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had, and apart from the 1925 legislation48 have, to have recourse to the means of
transfer ordinarily appropriate to the property in question, namely, assignment,
conveyance, delivery, or formal transfer.49
9. The head 50
The revelation, that forty years after Hargreaves' complaint it remained right for
Lord Wilberforce, like Hargreaves himself, to place the blame for the modern
confusion and mystification, in what to Blackstone was a "rational science"51 and a
"rational entertainment",52 on extra-curial writings becomes 911 the more
depressing, when it appears that confusion has been worse confounded by judicial
and academic reliance on textbooks and articles, which themselves sought to
explain what were seen as ancient mysteries. But such reliance must necessarily
have that result. The necessity flows not from some academic vice, from which the
Courts are exempt, but from the very nature oflanguage. It may be trite, but it is
nonetheless apt, to quote from Hart:53
"Whichever device, precedent or legislation [or, we should add, discussion],
is chosen for the communication of standards of behaviour, these, however
smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point
where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have
what has been termed an open texture. So far we have presented this, in the
case oflegislation, as a general feature of human language; uncertainty at the
borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general classifying terms in
any form of communication concerning matters of fact. Natural languages
like English are when so used irreducibly open textured."
That the position is still worse when dealing with matters of abstraction appears
from inter alia his earlier discussion of normative language. 54
In our respectful submission, it was this linguistic necessity and not his
Lordship's denial oflogic in the law, which justified the observations of the Earl of
48. See the text at and following n. 42(2) supra. It was only of the Common Law, untainted by modern
Acts of Parliament, that Coke said, "Ratio escanima legis": Co. Liu. Epil. We therefore offer no defence
or explanation for the illogicality of the statutory extension of the power to assent, in respect of real
estate, to all administrators. Another flagrant example of how much ill is to be expected of Parliament
in this regard may be seen in the reports of the debates on the Nullity of Marriage Bill, especially in 317
Hansard (Lords) at 809 and in 318 op. cit., at pp. 936-7.
49. See the text at and following and n. 17(1) supra. Ifthe administrator does not do as he ought then,
because the beneficiary has no title, recourse must be had to equity: Jones v. Tanner (1827) 5 B. & c.
542.
50. See Shorcer a.E.D. (1984) sub nom. "Head" sb. III 6.
51. 2 Com. 2.
52. Ibid., at 44.
53. The Concept of Law (1972), pp. 124 et seq.. The emphasis is the author's.
54. Ibid., p. 56.
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Halsbury, LC, in Quinn v. Leathem:55
" ... that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts
proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions
which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole
law, but governed and ,qualified by the particular facts of the case in which
such expressions are to be found ... a case is only an authority for what it
actually decides."
But writings, such as this of ours and those of our distinguished predecessors,
are not composed on the basis of "particular facts proved", nor do any of them
actually decide anything. Since they cannot be so confined, neither should they be
so respected, as are judgments; and hence "the dangers, well perceived by our
predecessors but tending to be neglected in modern times, of placing reliance on
textbook authority for an analysis of judicial decisions."56
lOA.The tail,5?its root (in the text ofa Lord Chief Justice)
Coke's formula, which we adopt so heartily,58 appears in his commentary on the
word "right" in the following sentence of Littleton:
"In the same manner it is, where tenant in taile grant all his estate to another;
in this case the grantee hath no estate but for terme of life of the tenant in
taile, and the reversion of the taile is not in the tenant in taile, because he hath
granted all his estate, and his right, &c."
The commentary (in Butler's edition) reads:
"Right",Jus, sive rectum, (which Littleton often useth) signifieth properly,
and specially in writs and pleadings, when an estate is turned to a right, as by
discontinuance, disseisen, &c. where it shall bee said, quodjus discendit et non
terra. But (Right) doth also include the [\7" estate in esse in [345]
conveyances; and therefore if tenant in fee simple make a lease b'
for yeares, and release all his right in the land to the lessee and his •
heires, the whole estate in fee simple passeth.
And so commonly in fines, the right of the land includeth and passeth the
state of the land; as A. cognovit tenementa pradicta essejus ipsius, B. &c. And
the statute [a] saith,jus suum defendere, (which is) statum suum. And note that
55. [1901]A.C. 495, 506. Cf the approach of Browne-Wilkinson VC, in Lonrho pic v. Tebbitt [1991]4
All E.R. 973, at p. 979h (Ch.D.); affd. [1992] 4 All E.R. 280 (C.A.).
56. See the text at and n. 5(1), supra.
57. See Shorter D.E.D. (1984) sub nom. "Tail" sb.' 4.
58. At n. 56(1), supra.
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there isjus recuperandi, jus intrandi, jus habendi, jus retinendi, jus percipiendl~
jus possidendi.
Title, properly, (as some say) is, when a man hath a lawfull cause of entry
into lands whereof another is seised, for the which hee can have no action, as
title of condition, title of mortmaine, &c. But legally this word (Title)
includeth a right also, as you shall perceive in many places in Littleton: and
title is the more generall word; for every right is a title, but every title is not
such a right for which an action lieth; and therefore Titulus est justa causa
possidendi quod nostrum est, and signifieth the meanes whereby a man
commeth to land, as his title is by fine or by feoffment, &c. And when the
plaintife in assise maketh himselfe a title, the tenant may say, Veniat assisa
super titulum; which is as much to say, as upon the title which the plaintife
hath made by that particular conveyance. Et dicitur titulus a tuendo, because
by it he holdeth and defendeth his land; and as by a release of a right a title is
released, so by release of a title a right is released also.
According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1984) "discontinuance" meant,
"interruption of a right of possession or right of entry, consequent upon a
wrongful alienation by the tenant in possession for a larger estate than he was
entitled to"; and "disseisin", "usually, the wrongful dispossession of the lands,
etc. of another: since 15th c. not used of personalty". "Quod jus discendit et non
terra" on our interpretation is, "That which descends as a right and not as a
tenement", 59 and' 'ius suum defendere", "the right to defend his estate". According
to the same dictionary "fine" meant, "compromise of a fictitious or collusive suit
for the possession of lands; formerly in use as a mode of conveyance."
Thus we understand Coke to be defining 'right' as being something to be
declared or enforced by the court (or, indeed, as a right to sue or a right of action)
on proof of 'title', so that until the 'title' be challenged by somewrongdoing, actual
or fictitious (including collusive), so as to give the parties loci standi and the court
jurisdiction, there would be no 'right' but only 'title'.60 Hence: "every right is a
title, but every title is not such a right for which an action lieth" and a title is the
cause of the right of possessing or, on converting the first possessive (or genitive) to
an adjective, titulus est justa causa possidendi.
We have encountered the objection:61
"Coke's definition of title ... cannot be relied upon very far for any
purpose. He admits it to be only one of anumber of senses in which the word
could be taken and even in his day it was not very helpful."
59.Which for us conjures up notions of the early operation of the equitable doctrine of conversion and
the early transmission of choses in action.
60. Cf. at least the heading of section 17 in Thayer's "Possession and Ownership", (1907) 23 L.Q.R.
175 and 314 at p. 328.
"61.The author of the objection is the anonymous donor referred to in nn. 93 and 97 supra.
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This was not the opinion of Blackstone, who quotes it in his Commentaries,62 itself
a work of authority and evidently to be departed from only when it conflicts with
earlier writings, notably those of Coke himself.63 Coke's admission that his was
only one of a number of senses in which the word could be taken was subject to his
assertion that his is its legal sense. Presumably, as Hargreaves had to do again later,
Coke was urging on his contemporaries the "strict regard for the traditional
terminology of the law", whence alone flows the simplicity and coherence of the
rules of land law and from which even the 11th edition of Coke on Littleton seems
to have strayed in the note on folio 238(a),64 where it is said that out ofthe Statute
37 H.VI 1 fall "the donees and feoffees of the disseisor, for they come by title
though it is a defeasible one." But, if all titles are relative, a proposition from which
the objector did not express dissent, every title is theoretically defeasible by a
better; and the only true distinction of coming into property is Wiren's,65 "by title
or by tort" as determined in each case and only between the parties to the
litigation.
lOB. The tail, its extension (in the text of a Lord Chief Baron)
The passage in Gilbert's Tenures, on which we rely so heavily,66 reads:
"When any man is disseised, the disseisor has only the naked possession,
because the disseisee may enter and evict him; but against all other persons
the disseisor has a right, and in this respect only can be said to have the right
of possession, for in respect to the disseisee he has no right at all. But when a
descent is cast, the heir of the disseisor has ius possessionis because the
disseisee cannot enter upon his possession and evict him, but is put to his real
action, because the freehold is cast upon the heir."
It has been objected that our reliance indicates that we have not understood the
passage. For, says the same objector as before:
"[i]f it be land that is in question, the rule of the old common law was that
seisin, whether by right or wrong, gave the party seised an estate. Ifhe were
seised by wrong, this estate would be a fee simple. The disseisee was left with
no more than a right, either of entry or of action. The title of the disseisor,
and of those deriving title under him, was good against anyone save the
62. Op. cic. at and in n. 84 supra, at p. 195.There is, of course, the valid point that, since Coke's formula
makes title the cause of a right, he is earlier inconsistent in stating that every right is a title; for that is to
equate effect with cause. But that inconsistency does not invalidate the formula. For Coke's meaning
can be expressed adequately thus: "Every right is derived from a title; but every title does not give rise
to such a right for which an action lies."
63. Reid v. Mecro. Pol. Commr. [1973] Q.B. 551, at p. 559 per Lord Denning MR.
64. Which in the 19th ed. follows the quotation from Gilbert discussed in section lOB infra.
65. Which we paraphrase in the text at n. 78 and quote in n. 2(2) supra.
66. Expressly in n. 99 and implicitly in n. 2(2), supra.
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disseisee, or those deriving title under him. This is the point which Lord
Chief Baron Gilbert was making in the passage ... The distinction which he
takes ... between a naked possession and that right of possession which will
entitle me to recover in a possessory action even against one whose right is
better than my own was rendered obsolete by the abolition of the real
actions."
But the assertion, "that seisin ... by wrong gave the party seised an estate",
which we do not dispute, leaves unanswered the question, whether or not that
estate was supported by title, to which we should respond in the negative; and the
assertion, that under the old law a disseisor's estate was always a fee simple,
whether true or not,67 contributes nothing to the debate.
With all due diffidence and deference, the objector's implication, that under
"the rule of the old common law" seisin was more than the fact of possession in
circumstances whereof the law would take account for one or more of its purposes,
whether adjectival or substantive, seems to be completely opposed to Maitland68
who supports his argument with many instances. Gilbert's example of the conflict
between the disseisee and the heir of the disseisor is merely the converse of the
example of the conflict of titles constituted by Palmer v. Palmer69 and of the
operation of the presumption, omnia praesumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta, as
reflected in the maxim, in aequali jure potior est conditio possidentis.70 As we
understand it, a disseisee, whether he had or had not lost what Coke calls "entrie",
could in a possessory action (made available for the preservation of public order)
recover against a disseisor whose right was better than his own but who, having
failed to take the proper proceedings, was a wrongdoer. However, in the passage
cited by the objector Gilbert does not speak of the disseisor's heir recovering (but
only, subject to the bringing of a real action by the disseisee, of his retaining)
possession against the disseisee, nor of anyone at all recovering nor even (provided
one were sued in the right form) retaining, possession against another "whose
right was better than [one's] own." In other words, namely, those used by US,71
against the disseisor, who cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong,
"metaphorically, (or, perhaps, laxly)" the disseisee's "possession is a title", while
against the disseisor's heir who has done no, but merely succeeded to the fruits of
67. It contradicts the modern view, which we set out in section 10C infra; but admittedly, for whatever
reason, in Co. Liu. at 2a reference is made only to the fee simple.
68. Supra n. 5(1), especially p. 334; and see n. 58(1), supra.
69. See n. 29(1), supra.
70. See the text at nn. IO(I) and II (I) supra.
71. In the text at n. 9(2), supra in reliance on Lord Campbell CJ.
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another's, wrong72 the disseisee must prove his title in the ordinary way.73 Thus
explained, even Gilbert's use of ius is consistent with Coke's proposition, that
"every right is a title". With respect, the objector's relation of the abolition of the
real actions seems irrelevant to the argument. For "[t]he forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from [their] graves", 74so that, even with our modern
single form of writ we can still expect to see in the pleadings, which it initiates,
reflections of the multiplicity and variety of its ancestors.
lOCo The tail, its tip (in modern cases of adverse possession against
leaseholders)
Above,75 we cite Australian authority for the proposition that, if a usurper or
squatter occupies land that is let, then, until the expiry, surrender or other
determination of the lease, his possession is adverse only to the interest of the
tenant, whose obligations to the landlord are not thereby affected (there being no
assignment of the lease), so that time does not begin to run against the landlord
72. Our limitation of "wrong" is warranted by Co. Lin. 2a: "So as every man that hath a fee simple,
hath it either by right or by wrong. If by right, then he hath it either by purchase or descent. If by
wrong, then either by disseisin, intrusion, abatement, usurpation, &c." The distinctions between the
different types of wrong are drawn at 277a-b. Metaphorically Coke's use here of "right" is consistent
with the passage at 345b extracted in section lOA (supra) and see the text following n. 73(2), infra.
73.Wherein may be met the plea of ius tertii; for Gilbert CB's example is but the converse of that in the
text at n. 66(I), supra.
74. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law (cited inn. 5B(I),supra), p. 1. In the fourth lecture he
contrasts "possessory" with "proprietary", but he makes it clear that by the "proprietary" actions he
meant the "real" included in Blackstone's definitions (3 Com. 117, liB) which he notes as follows:
"Real actions, which concern real property only, are such whereby the plaintiff, here called the
demandant, claims title to have any lands, or tenements, rents, commons, or other
hereditaments in fee simple, fee tailor for term of life.
Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt, a personal duty, or damages in lieu
thereof; and likewise, whereby a man claims a satisfaction in damages for some injury done to
his person or property.
Mixed actions are suits partaking of the nature of the other two, wherein some real property is
demanded, and also personal damages for a wrong sustained."
The emphasis on title is ours; and, because on p. 49Maitland recalls only "the accepted definition of
the words 'real', 'personal', and 'mixed' as applied to actions; meaning, that is to say, actions of which
the result is the recovery of the thing or of damages or of both, respectively", we supplement him from
Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law (1953) with its references to "personal actions, in which the plaintiff
sought to recover a debt or damages from the defendant; real actions, in which he sought to establish his
ticle [our emphasis] to land or other hereditaments; mixed actions, in which he sought only to establish
his right of possession [our emphasis] to land."
Thus we consider it legitimate for us to assume that by "real action" Gilbert CB, means a writ of
right and for us to mean (and to assume that the objector also means) by possessory action one of the
possessory assizes, one of the writs of entry, or the writ of trespass de ejeccionefirmae. The irrelevance
(asserted alsoby the objector) ofwhether or not the disseisee's right of entry (Coke's "entrie") had been
removed ("tolled"), we have also deduced from p. 49 of Maitland's Forms of Action. The connexion
between Co. Lin. 23Baand the Lord Chief Baron's exposition, which Butler makes, is only that both
deal with loss ofthe right of entry; for he appends the latter to Littleton's sentence, "The entrie of the
disseisee is taken away."
75. In n. 89, supra. For the criticisms which led to this expansion of that note we thank Mrs. Cooke, and
for his consideration of the result we thank Mr. Smith, both of Reading University.
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until the lease be determined. But, surely, as is implied by Lord Radcliffe76 and
despite the difficulties caused by Lord Denning's use of the word 'title', 77 it is also
the ratio of Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property Co. 78 in which, on the tenant's
surrender of the lease to the landlord after the expiration of the limitation period,
the latter became entitled to eject a squatter, but which is criticized by Megarry &
Wade.79 Its objection is that a tenant, who has himself "lost all power to eject [the
squatter], ... cannot ... confer any such power upon [the landlord]." But the
tenant is not conferring any such power. It is the determination of the lease, the
consequent merger of the leasehold with what had been the reversion and the
resulting extinction of the only interest owned by the squatter, that entitle the
landlord to evict him; and it matters not whether the extinction be effected by
surrender, or by efflux ion of time, or by forfeiture. Nor, in the case of unregistered
land, but can there be any question but that the tenant retains the right to
surrender; for the squatter, having taken possession of nothing that belongs to the
landlord, can have no relationship with the landlord and, in particular, cannot
replace the tenant in the landlord's affections.80
On the other hand, that its learned authors, to justify Spectrum Investment v.
Holmes,81 rely82 on a 'parliamentary conveyance', though understandable in view
of the trust created and maintained by section 75( 1) of the Land Registration Act
1925 in the interim between the expiration of the limitation period and the
registration of the adverse possessor's title, nevertheless, in our respectful
submission, unnecessarily complicates matters. For, if there were a conveyance,
then, until registration under section 75(3), one might expect the adverse
possessor, through a beneficiary's normal obligation to afford his trustee
indemnity, whether out of the trust estate,83 or perhaps personally,84 to find
himself, albeit indirectly, liable on the covenants of the lease, in contrast to the
position of the usurper of, or squatter on, unregistered land, as described below.
Moreover, to characterize the effect of section 75(2), which entitles the adverse
possessor after the lapse of the prescribed period to apply for registration of his
proprietorship, as a 'parliamentary conveyance' is no more justified than the like
characterization of the effect of the Limitation Act on unregistered land. 85 For that
entitlement is no more than the reflection of the property which, with title, the
76. In his fourth complete sentence: [1963] A.C. at p. 536.
77. Ibid., at p. 545.
78. [1963] A.C. 510 (H.L.) wherein Taylor v. Twinberrow [1930] 2 K.B. 16 (C.A.) was approved and
whence a dictum of Lord Denning, who was one of the majority, was followed in Tickner v.Buzzacott
[1965] I All E.R. 131 (Ch.D.).
79. Op. cit., p. 1052.
80. See Shorter Q.E.D. (1984) sub nom. "affection" sb. I.
81. (1981] 1 W.L.R. 221 (Ch.D.).
82. Op. cit., at p. 1053.
83. Stott v. Milne (1884) 25 Ch.D. 710 (C.A.).
84. Hardoon v. Belilios [1901] A.C. 118P.c.
85. See the text at and n. 81(I), supra.
134
SIMPLICITY AND COHERENCE IN THE FIELD OF OWNERSHIP
adverse possessor gained on the extinction of the title of the dispossessed and on
which we remarked above.86
To justify Spectrum and to render it, despite the dissimilar result, perfectly
consistent with the decision of the House of Lords it is enough simply to give full
effect to the policy of certainty and disclosure underlying the Land Registration
Act. For a tenant who has (through the combined effect of adverse possession for
the prescribed period, the possessor's application under section 75(2) and the
Registrar's entry pursuant to section 75(3)) lost his title to a registered leasehold
estate, of which the adverse possessor has become registered as the proprietor, can
and must have nothing to surrender to the landlord because, pursuant to that
policy,87 the registered estate must comprise every right, title, estate and interest of
the lessee in, to and under the lease88 and none other than the registered proprietor
may deal with that estate or any part of it; and it was on a vain attempt by such
another89 that the later case turned.
However (following Tickner v. Buzzacou,90 which involved forfeiture for non-
payment of rent, and subject to the possibility of estoppel), the adverse possessor
may well, between the expiration of the limitation period and the expiry of the
lease, be liable to the consequences of forfeiture of the lease for breach of a
covenant against disposition, abandonment or the like and, almost inevitably,
since "[h]e cannot pay the rent without the authority ofthe leaseholder",91 for its
non-payment. This will be so, whether or not the leasehold estate constitutes
registered land and, if registered, whether or not the adverse possessor be the
registered proprietor thereof. For in the last instance the forfeiture will constitute
a dealing by the landlord, who retains his recognition under the Act, not by the
tenant, who has lost it. Furthermore, the forfeiture would be only against the
tenant; for, there having been no assignment, the usurper, or squatter, and his
successors have no interest in, or obligation under, the lease as a contract.
Nevertheless, the forfeiture having terminated the only interest in the land to have
been adversely possessed, the original adverse possessor or his successor may then
86. In the text at n. 80(I).
87. And by virtue of ss.9, 11,69(1) and (4) and 75 of the Act.
88. Save as regards those who claim by virtue of dealings of the registered proprietor (for their interests,
even if unregistered, will be held by him on trust for them); and save as regards the unregistered
interests which, by statute, are preserved, or even made overriding. Whatever may be the merits of
Kenny's subtle argument in [1982]Conv. 201, its very subtleties would defeat the policy ofthe Act. The
only support for the meaning which he attributes to ss.69 and 75, that the adverse possessor becomes
registered as proprietor of an estate subject to its being liable to surrender by the tenant, is the policy
declared by the judges, whom he quotes, to keep the differences between registered and unregistered
land to a minimum. But the policy of the Act itself must take precedence.
89./. e., by the lessee after the squatter had become registered as the proprietor of the relevant leasehold
estate.
90. N. 78(2), supra.
91. Per Lord Denning in Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property Co., n. 78(2), supra, at p. 547, unless in
some way, which was not pursued in Ticknerv. Buzzacott, ibid., it could be established that, in the case
of registered land, for a tenant to withhold authority would be a breach of the trust created by the
L.R.A. s.75(1).
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be evicted therefrom. Conversely, having no interest in the lease, so that there is
not even privity of estate (let alone privity of contract) between the landlord and
him, the adverse possessor is not personally liable to perform any of the covenants
therein, whether or not they run with the land.92 On the other hand, because
easements and restrictive covenants constitute exceptions from,93 and thus
limitations on, the grant of the interest adversely possessed, the adverse possessor
is bound by them.94
11. Envoy
A point divides us: Dr. Stebbings' first mentioned article asserted95that, in the
case of an asset with documentary title, before the written assent of an executor
who is also a testamentary trustee, "the implied assent [arising out of the clearance
of the estate] has the effect only of making the personal representative hold the
asset in question on trust for himself as trustee under the will." To the Victorians
among us, what we have written above96(namely, that with documentary title
there may be no room at all for implied assent and that, in the case of a gift to such
an executor who has cleared the estate, a written assent merely causes the title to
follow the property in the relevant asset which, by and since the clearance, has
been vested in him as trustee) has the great attraction that, in its light, there is no
apparent need for that trust. While Dr. Stebbings believes the trust to be possible,
and that indeed it does exist, between the change of status, brought about by the
clearance, and the transfer of title, effected by the written assent, Miss McClure
and Mr. Goldberg recoil from what they can see only as rejection of the rule in
Selby v. Alston,97 that a person cannot be trustee for himself where the legal and
equitable estates are commensurate. Dr. Stebbings claims there to be no rejection,
because the two separate capacities of executor and trustee, even when combined
in one human being, create two separate 'persons'. To Miss McClure and Mr.
Goldberg this theory seems: unable to withstand Occam's Razor; to conflict with
the doctrine which forbids the same person to be a plaintiff and a defendant in the
same action,98or even to be named twice on the record of an action, once in his
personal, and again in a representative, capacity;99and to be inconsistent with the
vesting of the asset in the executor as trustee and the consequent expiry of the
executorship quoad that asset.l Though the point be sharp, the division is not,
being blunted and bridged by the continuing correspondence of cheerful debate.
92. Tichborne v. Weir (1892) 67 L.T. 735 (C.A.).
93. Cj. Slade J, in re Bond Worth Ltd. [1980] Ch. 228, at p. 253D.
94. Re Nisbet & Pores' Contract [1906] 1 Ch. 386 (C.A.).
95. Supra n. 7(1), at p. 427.
96. In the text at and about n. 39(2), supra.
97. See n. 22(1), supra.
98. Re Phillips [1931] W.N. 271.
99. Hardie & Lane Ltd. v. Chi/tern [1928] I K.B. 663, at pp. 700-1 (C.A.).
1. But the expiry is not entire: see Stebbings, "The Fallacy of Functus Officio in the Administration of
Estates", [1990] Conv. 427.
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